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Summary 
The usual confidence sphere for a multivariate normal mean can be 
uniformly improved upon, it terms of coverage probability, by recentering 
it at a James-Stein positive part estimator. Furthermore, there is strong 
evidence that uniform improvement in terms of both volume and coverage 
probability can also be attained. However, these improved sets have been 
criticized because of suspected poor conditional performance. Using the 
theory of relevant betting procedures, which provides an objective means 
for assessing the conditional performance of a statistical procedure, it is 
shown that a large class of James-Stein confidence sets exhibit good 
conditional behavior: they do not allow the existence of super-relevant 
betting procedures. 
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1. Introduction. Recent advances in the theory of set estimation 
have led to some disturbing questions within the frequentist theory of 
statistics. In particular, if C(X) is a set estimator for a parameter 9 
that satisfies 
( 1.1) for all 9, 
then one might question the precision of asserting that one is "1-a 
confident" in the set estimator C(X). Instead, we would rather assert some 
confidence level greater that 1-a since we know that, given (1.1), the 
coverage probability at any value of 9 will be greater than 1-a. Con-
fidence sets with property (1.1) have received renewed criticism of late, 
one of most recent from Hinkley (1983): 
" .•. I do not find it useful to attach the probability .9, say, to an 
interval that covers with probability 1. The interval is only useful 
if we can state what the probability is, with reasonable accuracy." 
Concerns such as these expressed by Hinkley are not new; Stevens (1950), in 
a paper dealing with binomial confidence intervals states, " ••. it is a 
statistician's duty to be wrong the stated proportion of times." The 
criticisms of both Hinkley and Stevens can, of course, be applied to any 
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conservative procedure, and point out that the user of a procedure that 
satisfies (1.1) might be "cheated" by only being allowed to assert a 
confidence level of 1-a. 
Part of the problem is that frequentist measures of precision are 
pre-experimental measures. Frequentist inference is unconditional (with 
respect to the realized data), so it cannot have the data-dependent 
precision that either Bayesian or likelihood inference has. Thus there is 
a trade off between a more precise, but conditional, inference and a less 
precise, but unconditional, inference. 
Another problem is that classical frequentist theory seems to try to 
be too objective, guarding against values of 9 that are unreasonable (e.g., 
9 • m), It is possible to make frequentist statements more precise by 
limiting the range of 9 in some way, which is a basic idea underlying the 
"parametric empirical Bayes" approach of Morris (1983). Another "way out" 
of this problem is to try to combine the more precise Bayesian conclusions 
with some degree of frequentist objectivity, which is an underlying idea of 
the "robust Bayesian" approach of Berger (1982). Both of these approaches 
have merit, and succeed in producing more precise inferences (at the cost 
of some objectivity), but they do not address the main issue with which we 
are concerned: Under what conditions can the frequentist feel comfortable 
in assigning a confidence of 1-a to a set estimator that satisfies (1.1)? 
The answer to this question, we feel, lies within the theory of 
relevant betting procedures, a theory which provides an objective measure 
of the conditional performance of a set estimator. The beginnings of the 
theory date back to Fisher (1956), but were first formalized by Buehler 
(1959). Buehler argued that one can make the statement "the probability 
that the set C(X) covers 9 is 1-a" only if one is willing to accept bets 
that 9 t C(X) at odds 1-a:a, and accept bets that 9 e C(X) at odds a:l-a. 
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If, for a given set estimator C(X), there exists a subset, S, of the sample 
space (a recognizable subset in the terminology of Fisher, 1956), that 
satisfies either 
P9(a E C(X)jX E S) > 1-a+E for all 9, 
(1.2) or 
for all 9, 
for some E>O, the one should have doubts about assigning confidence 1-a to 
the set C(X). A subsetS that satisfies (1.2) is called a relevant subset 
for C(X), and provides a winning betting strategy against C(X). Converse-
ly, if no such subsets exist for a set estimator C(X), with confidence 1-a, 
then there is no winning strategy and we are justified in assigning 
confidence 1-a to C(X) no matter what the coverage probability may be. 
We will refer to the pair <C(X),l-a> as a confidence set for the 
parameter 9 with confidence level 1-a. (In general, a may be a function of 
X, a•a(X), but here we will restrict attention to a constant confidence 
level.) The confidence set <C(X),1-a> need not be a frequentist 1-a 
confidence region in that 
(1.3) inf9P[9 E C(X)) • 1 -a 
but we assume that if one is willing to use <C(X),1-a>, then one is willing 
to accept all bets in the manner stated above. If, however, 1-a is also 
the frequentist confidence level in the sense of (1.3), then <C(X),l-a> 
has, to a certain extent, answered the criticisms of Hinkley and Stevens. 
The theory of relevant betting procedures, therefore, gives us a mathemat-
ical framework for evaluating the conditional performance of a frequentist 
confidence set. 
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If a satisfies (1.3) and there are no relevant subsets for <C(X),1-a>, 
then <C(X),1-a> is an extremely desirable confidence set. Not only does it 
have the frequentist property of guaranteeing a minimum coverage 
probability, but it also has no serious conditional flaws. Such properties 
are enjoyed by the usual confidence sphere for a multivariate normal mean. 
The main purpose of this paper is to show that similar properties are 
enjoyed by confidence spheres recentered at some James-Stein type 
estimators (which formed part of the target of Hinkley's criticism). 
Moreover, these recentered spheres may even have reduced radius and still 
remain 1-a confidence sets within the theory of relevant betting procedures. 
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2. Betting Procedures. Buehler's concept of relevant subsets was 
extended and formalized by Robinson (1979a) to the concept of relevant 
betting procedures (i.e., functions). Betting strategies exist which 
cannot be expressed in terms of subsets, so Robinson's extension was 
intended to include all possible betting strategies. Thus, a betting 
procedure, s(X), is defined to be any bounded function of X. Without loss 
of generality we take this bound to be unity. We can think of ls(x)l as 
the probability that a bet of one unit is made when X•x is observed, with 
the sign of s(X) giving the direction of the bet. 
If <C(X),B(X)> is a confidence set, then the betting procedure s(X) is 
said to be 
i. semirelevant if 
E9{[I(9 t C(X)) - B(X)] ~ 0 for all e 
and is strictly positive for some e, 
ii. relevant if, for some t > 0, 
E8{[I(8 t C(X)) - B(X)]s(X)} ~ eE8 1s(X)I for all e 
with strict inequality for some e, 
iii. super-relevant if, for some t > 0 
E8{[I(9 t C(x) ) - B(X)]s(X)} ~ t for all e. 
Notice that if s(X) is the indicator function of some set, then the 
above definition of a relevant betting procedure reduces to that of 
Buehler. 
If X is an observation from a p-variate normal distribution with mean 
vector e and covariance matrix I, the usual frequentist 1-a confidence set 
is 
(2.1) 
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where c satisfies P( X 2 < c 2 ) ., 1-a. p From the results of Robinson 
(1979b), it follows that c0 (X) does not allow relevant betting procedures, 
which is the strongest conditional property that one can expect c0 (X) to 
have. (Only proper Bayes posterior confidence sets do not allow the 
existence of semirelevant betting procedures.) 
When evaluating procedures on both frequentist and conditional 
grounds, there seems to be a trade-off in the sense that procedures with 
the strongest conditional properties (i.e., proper Bayes procedures) have 
weaker frequentist properties, and vice versa. Since we are addressing 
conditional properties from a frequentist standpoint, and want to use 
procedures that are 1 - a procedures in a frequentist sense, we cannot hope 
that these procedures have the strongest conditional properties. What we 
can hope for, instead, is that our frequentist procedures have a condition-
al property that is strong enough to eliminate any aberrant behavior. 
According to Bondar (1977), his conditional confidence procedure, which is 
equivalent to the absence of super-relevant betting procedures, is strong 
enough to do this. In particular, it is strong enough to eliminate Cox's 
paradox (Cox, 1958). Thus, we focus on the existence of super-relevant 
betting procedures. 
An improvement on c0 (X), in frequentist terms, is obtained by recen-
tering c0 (X) at a positive-part James Stein estimator. The set estimator 
(2.2) 
satisfies 
(2.3) for all 9, 
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for a range of values of a, 0 ~a~ a0 < p- 2. (Hwang and Casella, 1982). 
Moreover, there is strong evidence, (Casella and Hwang, 1983), mostly 
numerical, that the set estimator 
(2.4) 
also dominates c0 (X) in coverage probability for certain choices of v(X), 
lv(X)I ~ 1. 
The conditional criticisms voiced against c4(X) are cause for concern, 
but only minor concern, since c4(X) will tend to err on the conservative 
side; covering 9 more often than the nominal confidence level asserts. In 
betting terminology, <C 4(X),1-a> allows the existence of a positively 
biased semirelevant betting procedure, since s(X) • 1 will give 
E9{(I(9EC4(X)] - (1-a)}s(X) ~ 0. In practical applications this deficiency 
is extremely minor: we tend to forgive errors on the conservative side. 
v Criticisms of c 4(X) are more serious, since it seems possible to make 
v(X) very small over a range of X values, leading to confidence sets that, 
conditionally, will cover 9 with probability much less than 1-a. This 
criticism is more serious because it cast doubts on whether the frequentist 
1-a guarantee is really guaranteeing anything. 
These conditional criticisms are answered, within the theory of 
relevant betting procedures, in the next section. The answer is quite 
simple: under mild conditions on &(X) and v(X), neither <C6(X),1-a> nor 
c;(x). 1-a> allow the existence of super-relevant betting procedures. 
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3. Jaaes-Stein Confidence Sets. The set estimator C0(X) of (2.2) is 
a frequentist 1-~ confidence set. The next theorem shows that it is also 
reasonable to regard <C 0 (X),1-~> as a 1-a confidence set within the theory 
of relevant betting procedures. 
Theorea 3.1: Let X- Np(9,I), p ~ 3, and let~ and c satisfy P9(1X- 91 ~c) 
• P(x2 ~ c2 ) • 1-~. Let o(X) • [1- y(IXI)]X, 0 ~ y(X) ~ 1, and let p 
C0(X) • {9:19- o(X)I ~ c} 
If there exist positive constants K0 , K1 and r > 1 such that 
IY( IXI)I < K1/1XIr for IXI 2 > K0 , then there are no super-relevant betting 
procedures against the set estimator <C 0 (X),1-~>. 
Proof: Suppose s(X) is super-relevant for <C 0 (X),1-~>. Then there exist 
£ > 0 such that 
( 3.1) 
for all e. -1 Multiply both sides of (3.1) by ~b(e), a N[O,(b - 1)] density 
(0 < b < 1) and integrate over all e. If s(X) is a super-relevant betting 
procedure it then follows that 
(3.2) I E9{I[eec6(X)] - (1 - ~)}s(X)~b(9)de ~ e • 
e 
The proof will proceed by showing that for sufficiently small b the 
left hand side of (3.2) is less than £. This will contradict the supposi-
tion that s(X) is super-relevant and establish the theorem. To this end, 
write 
( 3. 3) 
I E9{I[eec6(X)] - (1- ~)}s(X)wb(9)de 
e 
. I[ I wb(9IX)d9- o-~)]s(x)~(X)dX 
X 9tC0(X) 
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when ~b(9IX) is the conditional density of 6 given X, N[(1-b)X,(1-b)I], and 
-1 ~(X) is the marginal density of X, N(O,b I). 
The integration over X in (3.3) will be split into three pieces: let h 
l+h be a positive constant, satisfying l-h < r, and consider the three sets 
{IXI:IXI 2 < b-l+h}, {IXI:IXI 2 > b-1-h}, and {X:b-1+h < IXI 2 < b-1-h}. Note 
that the union of these three sets is the entire region of integration. 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
Consider first the integration over the set {S:IXI 2 < b-l+h}. We have 
$ f ls(X)I~(X)dX 
{X:IXI 2 < b-l+h} 
s Pb(IXI 2 < b-l+h) 
since ls(X)I $ 1. Furthermore, 
(3.6) 
-1-h The integration over {X:IXI 2 > b } is handled in the same manner. 
The contribution to -1-h (3.3) from this region is bounded by Pb(IXI 2 > b ), 
which also goes to zero as b~. 
It only remains to establish that the integral over the middle region 
can be made sufficiently small. If we show that, for sufficiently small b, 
(3.7) f [ I , ~(9jX)d9 - (1-a) Js(X)~(X)dX $ (e/3) 
it will then follow that (3.2), and hence (3.1) is contradicted, and the 
theorem will be established. 
Straight forward transformations will establish that 
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f6(X)I+c 
1- ]t J ~x~-1 ~ 1:b {c2 - [y-f6(X)j]2}) 
[ 21r(l b) I6(X)I-c 
-t[y-(1-b) lXI J2 
x e ( 1-b) dy 
Using the facts that f6(X)f-c S y S f6(X)I + c,O ~ y(X) ~ 1,jy(X)I < K1/1XIr 
for fXI 2 > K0 , b- 1+h < IXI 2 < b- 1-hand r > (1+h)/(1-h), it can be shown 
that for suffiently small b, 
(3.9) (y- f6(X)f) 2 - O(b) S [y- (i=~)IXI] 2 ~ [y- f6(X)f] 2 + O(b), 
where O(b)~ as b~. Also, for f6(X)I - c < y < f6(X)f + c, 
nfxz ~ {c2- [y-f6(X)f]2}) ~ nfxz ~ _!_ {c2- [y-I6(X)f]2}) c\ p-1 ~, p-1 1-b 
( 3.10) 
Using the fact that 
{ P(x~-l S E) max P(a ~ x2 1 S a + E) • 
a:a>O p- P[a*(E) S x2 ~ a*(E)+E] p-1 
if p - 3 
if p ) 3, 
where a*(E) • Eexp[- E/(p- 3)]/{1 - exp[-£/(p- 3)]}, it follows that, for 
f6(X)I - c < y < f6(X)f +c. 
(3.11) P{c2 - [y- f6(X)I) 2 S x~_ 1 ~ c2 - [y- f6(X)f 2 } + ~~~} • O(b). 
Finally, noting that 
f6(X)f+c 
(3.12) f P{x~-1 
f6(X)f-c 
we have, using (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12), 
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for b-1+h < IXI 2 < b-1-h. So, for sufficiently small b, 
(3.15) < (e/3) f ls(X)Imb(X)dX 
{X:b-1+h<IXIz<b-1-h} 
~ (e/3)P(b-1+h < IXI 2 < b-1-h) 
~ e/3 
completing the proof. I I 
In retrospect, the result in Theorem 3.1 is not all that surprising; 
the fact that there are no super-relevant betting procedures against 
<c 6(X),1-a> is closely related to the fact that none exist against 
<c0 ,1-a>. This is somewhat analogous to the case of minimax point estima-
tion, where all minimax estimators must collapse to X as lXI~· 
Theorem 3.1 can be extended to cover the more general confidence set 
Theorem 3.2: Suppose &(X) and y(fXI) are as in Theorem 3.1, and define 
C~(X) • {9:19- 6(X)I ~ cv(X)} , 
where c satisfies P(x 2 ~ c 2 ) • 1-a and v(X) > 0 for all X. If there p 
exist constants K1 , K2 and t>O such that fv(X)-11 ~ K2/1XIt for IXI 2 > K1 , 
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then there are no super-relevant betting procedures against the set 
v 
estimator <C6(X),1-a>. 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.1, with minor modifications, will also 
suffice to prove this theorem. We will only indicate the modifications. 
-1+h Clearly, the arguments used for the regions {X:fXI 2 < b } and 
{X:IXI 2 > b-1-h} will also serve here, so we only need concentrate on 
{X:b-1+h < IXI 2 < b-1-h}. The counterpart to equation (3.8) is 
1 "b(&IX)da 
9tC6 (X) 
(3.15) 
I a(X)+cv(X) 
• (2w(~-b)]t J ~x~-1 
J&(X)f-cv(X) 
-~ [y-(1-b) lXI )2 
(1-b) dy x e 
~ _!_ {c2v2(X)-[y-f&(X)f2)}) 1-b 
and the assumption on v(X) is enough to show that, for ytf&(X)f ± cv(X), 
( 3.16) [y-f&(X)f) 2 _ O(b) ~ (y-(1-b)fXI] 2 ~ [y-I&(X)f] 2 + O(b) 
v(X) 1-b v(X) 
The argument used in establishing (3.11) can also be used to establish 
nfc2v2(X)- (y-J&(X)f)2 ~ X2 ~ c2v2(X)- (y-f&(X)f)2 + E£:) • O(b). ~, p-1 1-b 
Since we also have 
(3.17) _!_ 
../2'lf 
J&(X)l+cv(X) -t(y-I&(X)I] 2 f P{x2 ~ c2v2 (X)-[y-J&(X)] 2 }e v(X) dy • 1-a + O(b) p-1 
J&(X)I-cv(X) 
bounds analagons to (3.13) can be obtained, establishing the theorem. I I 
Remark: The condition v(X) > 0 for all X is crucial in obtaining the 
bounds in (3.16). Clearly, if v(X) • 0 for a set of positive Lebesgue 
measure, then the set {X:v(X) • 0} forms the basis for a super-relevant 
v betting procedure against <c8(X), 1-a>. 
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The conditions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 cover confidence sets centered 
at the positive-part James-Stein estimator, but not those centered at the 
ordinary James-Stein estimator. Confidence sets centered at the ordinary 
James-Stein estimator. 
(3.18) JS C JS(X) • {9: 19- 6 (X) I ~ c} 
6 
do allow the existence of super-relevant betting procedures, as the 
following argument shows. 
The coverage probability of C JS(X) can be calculated by integrating 
6 
over the region 
(3.19) 
where cosa • 9'X/I91 lXI. It is easy to see that this region is contained in 
( 3. 20) 
Consider the intersection of the region in (3.20) with {IXI:IXI 2 < h}, 
where 0 < h < a. If 191 > c, this intersection is empty. If 191 ~ c the 
intersection is given by the region 
(3.21) {IXI:r_(l9f) < lXI < ht} , r_(lel) = t{IGI - c + [(191 - c) 2 +4a]t}. 
Since r_(l91) ~ r_(O) • t[- c + (c 2 + 4a)t} > 0 for 0 ~ 191 ~ c, the 
intersection is empty for all 191 if ht < r_(O). Therefore, the betting 
procedure s(X) • -Irn _ , 1 n 1 \ 1 (1Xf 2 ) is super-relevant for c_JS(X). (This 
LV,L_\II>I.fJ 6 
betting procedure bets against coverage if lXI is small.) Note that this 
conclusion holds no matter what confidence level we attach to C JS(X). 
6 
The key defect in 6J5(X) is the unboundedness of I6J5 (X)I for finite X. 
Modifications of the above argument can be used to show the existence of 
super-relevant betting procedures for any estimator displaying this 
behavior. 
-14-
4. co .. ents. Critics of confidence sets such as <C&(X),l-a> and 
v 
<C&(X),l-a> will, no doubt, not be completely mollified by the results 
presented here. Once can argue, for example, that the non-existence of 
super-relevant betting procedures is really not a positive property, but 
rather the absence of a negative property; somewhat akin to the property of 
admissibility. (An admissible estimator is not necessarily good, but an 
inadmissible estimator can be improved.) However, if we regard this 
property as we regard admissibility, then we should choose our candidate 
estimators only from those that have the property. Under this principle, 
some James-Stein set estimators are reasonable alternatives to c0 (X). 
Furthermore, all the confidence set considered here, including c0 (X), 
allow the existence of semirelevant betting procedures. Thus, one can find 
a betting procedure for which the expected return is non-negative. While 
this less serious conditional flaw still may be a basis for criticism, it 
can be forgiven on two counts. First, we are considering alternatives to 
c0 (X), and it is reasonable to look among procedures whose conditional 
performance is similar to that of c0 (X), and not necessarily stronger. 
Second, it seems quite unlikely that any procedure, other than a proper 
Bayes posterior set, will allow the existence of semirelevant betting 
procedures. Therefore, if there is desire to retain some objectivity in 
the frequentist sense, it seems that one will have to put up with semi-
relevant procedures. 
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